@workingpaper{Asongu2013b_31,
title = {State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data},
author = {Oasis Kodila-Tedika Simplice A. Asongu},
editor = {African 2013 Governance and Development Institute WP/13/019},
url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/State-fragility-rent-seeking-and-lobbying.-Evidence-from-African-data.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
abstract = {This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using
hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation
building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking
and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that,
political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by
mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a
range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of
models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of
extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and
revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural
resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a
policy implication, there is a ‘sub-Saharan African specificity’ in ‘nation building’ and
prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are
contingent on the degree of fragility, since ‘fragile’ and ‘extreme fragile’ countries respond
differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility.},
keywords = {State fragility; rent seeking; lobbying; nation building; Africa},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}