PUBLICATIONS

@workingpaper{Nunoo2016,
title = {Employment Security and Workers’ Moonlighting Behaviour in Ghana},
author = {Isaac Koomso & Abigail Arthur Jacob Nunoo Kwabena Nkansah Darfor},
editor = {African 2016 Governance and Development Institute WP/16/006},
url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Employment-Security-and-Workers-Moonlighting-in-Ghana.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-04-06},
abstract = {Purpose - This study sets out to determine the effect of employment security on moonlighting in Ghana as a means to inform policy on enforcing issues of employment security.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper follows the work of Shishko and Rostker (1976) in using the GLSS6 data by applying the ordered logit estimation technique. An employment security index is created using four variables.

Findings - The findings indicated that as a person with a single job becomes more secure with employment, the likelihood of moonlighting is decreased by 0.03 while increasing levels of employment security for people with two and three or more jobs, on the contrary, increases the likelihood of moonlighting by 0.0297and 0.0008 respectively. This implies that workers can be made to stick to single jobs by providing them with higher levels of employment security but once they take on two or more jobs, providing
them with employment security pushes them to even want to moonlight the more.

Originality/value - With current harsh economic conditions in the country and the urgent need for multiple jobs (moonlighting) as a risk coping mechanism, little has been done on the role employment security plays as a catalyst or otherwise. This paper fills the gap by employing a comprehensive index on employment security in the case of Ghana.},
keywords = {employment contract, employment security, Ghana, job security, moonlighting, trade union},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}

@workingpaper{Kodila-Tedika2016,
title = {The Sensitive Nature of Social Trust to Intelligence},
author = {Simplice Asongu & Florentin Azia-Dimbu A Oasis Kodila-Tedika},
editor = {African 2016 Governance and Development Institute WP/16/005},
url = {http://afridev.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-Sensitive-Nature-of-Social-Trust-to-Intelligence.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-09},
abstract = {This study investigates the relationship between social trust and intelligence. The extreme bound analysis of Levine and Renelt is employed to directly assess the strength of the nexus. The findings confirm the positive and robust nexus between social trust and intelligence. We have contributed to the literature by confirming that the previously established positive linkage between intelligence and trust is not statistically fragile. In fact the nexus withstands further empirical scrutiny with more robust empirical strategies.},
keywords = {Trust; Intelligence; Human Capital; Extreme Bound Analysis},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}

@workingpaper{Asongu_581,
author = {Simplice Asongu A Oasis Kodila-Tedika},
url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Determinants-of-Property-Rights-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-09},
abstract = {This article complements existing literature by assessing determinants of property rights protection with particular emphasis on history, geography and institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 47 countries for the period 2000-2007. Random effects GLS regressions are employed using property rights measurements from the Mo Ibrahim and Heritage foundations. The results broadly show that ethnic fractionalisation, Polity IV and GDP per capita have positive effects on property rights institutions while the following have negative effects: military rule, the Protestant religion, maturity from colonial independence and population density. The findings have relevant policy implications for countries in the sub-region currently on the path to knowledge-based economies.},
keywords = {Property rights protection; Panel data; Africa},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}

@workingpaper{Asongu2016f,
title = {Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments},
author = {Pritam Singh & Sara Le Roux Simplice A. Asongu},
editor = {African 2016 Governance and Development Institute WP/16/004},
url = {http://afridev.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Fighting-Software-Piracy.-Some-Global-Conditional-Policy-Instruments.pdf},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-08},
abstract = {This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries for the period 1994-2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect of the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns, namely: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study.},
keywords = {Intellectual property rights; Panel data; Software piracy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {workingpaper}
}