AGDI a environ 300 publications actuellement.
2013 |
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801. | Asongu, Simplice A African Development Review, 25 (1), pp. 14–29, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: productivity; investment; human capital; asymmetric panel; causality; Africa @article{Asongu_763, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8268.2013.12010.x}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-17}, journal = {African Development Review}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, pages = {14–29}, abstract = {Our generation is experiencing the greatest demographic transition and Africa is at the centre of it. There is mounting concern over corresponding rising unemployment and depleting per capita income. We examine the issues in this paper from a long-run perspective by assessing the relationships among population growth and a plethora of investment dynamics: public, private, foreign and domestic investments. Using asymmetric panels from 38 countries with data spanning from 1977 to 2007, our findings reveal a long-run positive causal linkage from population growth to only public investment. But for domestic investment, permanent fluctuations in human capital affect permanent changes in other forms of investments. Robustness checks on corresponding short-run Granger causality analysis and the long-run ‘physical capital led investment’ nexus are consistent with the predictions of economic theory. As a policy implication, population growth may strangle only public finances in the long run. Hence, the need for measures that encourage family planning and create a conducive investment climate (and ease of doing business) for private and foreign investments. Seemingly, structural adjustments policies implemented by sampled countries may not have the desired investment effects in the distant future.}, keywords = {productivity; investment; human capital; asymmetric panel; causality; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Our generation is experiencing the greatest demographic transition and Africa is at the centre of it. There is mounting concern over corresponding rising unemployment and depleting per capita income. We examine the issues in this paper from a long-run perspective by assessing the relationships among population growth and a plethora of investment dynamics: public, private, foreign and domestic investments. Using asymmetric panels from 38 countries with data spanning from 1977 to 2007, our findings reveal a long-run positive causal linkage from population growth to only public investment. But for domestic investment, permanent fluctuations in human capital affect permanent changes in other forms of investments. Robustness checks on corresponding short-run Granger causality analysis and the long-run ‘physical capital led investment’ nexus are consistent with the predictions of economic theory. As a policy implication, population growth may strangle only public finances in the long run. Hence, the need for measures that encourage family planning and create a conducive investment climate (and ease of doing business) for private and foreign investments. Seemingly, structural adjustments policies implemented by sampled countries may not have the desired investment effects in the distant future. |
802. | Asongu, Simplice A Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 5 (1), pp. 65 - 84, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Banks, Disclosure, Liquidity, Post‐crisis, Risk management @article{Asongu_764, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17554171311308968}, doi = {10.1108/17554171311308968}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-13}, journal = {Qualitative Research in Financial Markets}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {65 - 84}, abstract = {Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants. Design/methodology/approach – The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories. Findings – Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Research limitations/implications – Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants. Originality/value – The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.}, keywords = {Banks, Disclosure, Liquidity, Post‐crisis, Risk management}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants. Design/methodology/approach – The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories. Findings – Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Research limitations/implications – Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants. Originality/value – The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk. |
803. | Asongu, Simplice A International Journal of Development Issues, 12 (1), pp. 36 - 52, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression @article{Asongu_765, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14468951311322109}, doi = {10.1108/14468951311322109}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-13}, journal = {International Journal of Development Issues}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {36 - 52}, abstract = {Purpose – Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010. Design/methodology/approach – The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption. Findings – Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high. Social implications – The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight. Originality/value – This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.}, keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010. Design/methodology/approach – The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption. Findings – Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high. Social implications – The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight. Originality/value – This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption. |
804. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5 (1), pp. 20 - 38, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Convergence, Currency area, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic disequilibrium, Financial Community of Africa, Monetary policy, National economy, Policy coordination @article{Asongu_766, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381311317763}, doi = {10.1108/17576381311317763}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-13}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {20 - 38}, abstract = {Purpose – A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones. Design/methodology/approach – In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence. Findings – But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. Practical implications – The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies. Originality/value – The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises.}, keywords = {Africa, Convergence, Currency area, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic disequilibrium, Financial Community of Africa, Monetary policy, National economy, Policy coordination}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones. Design/methodology/approach – In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence. Findings – But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. Practical implications – The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies. Originality/value – The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises. |
805. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5 (1), pp. 39 - 60, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Banks, Development, inflation, Monetary policy, panel, Prices @article{Asongu_767, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381311317772}, doi = {10.1108/17576381311317772}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-13}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {39 - 60}, abstract = {Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of policy options in financial dynamics (of money, credit, efficiency and size) on consumer prices. Soaring food prices have marked the geopolitical landscape of African countries in the past decade. Design/methodology/approach – The sample is limited to a panel of African countries for which inflation is non‐stationary. VAR models from both error correction and Granger causality perspectives are applied. Analyses of dynamic shocks and responses are also covered and six batteries of robustness checks are applied, to ensure consistency in the results. Findings – First, it is found that there are significant long‐run equilibriums between inflation and each financial dynamic. Second, when there is a disequilibrium, while only financial depth and financial size could be significantly used to exert deflationary pressures, inflation is significant in adjusting all financial dynamics. In other words, financial depth and financial size are more significant instruments in fighting inflation than financial efficiency and activity. Third, the financial intermediary dynamic of size appears to be more instrumental in exerting a deflationary tendency than financial intermediary depth. Fourth, the deflationary tendency from money supply is double that based on liquid liabilities. Practical implications – Monetary policy aimed at fighting inflation only based on bank deposits may not be very effective until other informal and semi‐formal financial sectors are taken into account. It could be inferred that, tight monetary policy targeting the ability of banks to grant credit (in relation to central bank credits) is more effective in tackling consumer price inflation than that, targeting the ability of banks to receive deposits. In the same vein, adjusting the lending rate could be more effective than adjusting the deposit rate. The insignificance of financial allocation efficiency and financial activity as policy tools in the battle against inflation could be explained by the (well documented) surplus liquidity issues experienced by the African banking sector. Social implications – This paper helps in providing monetary policy options in the fight against soaring consumer prices. By keeping inflationary pressures on food prices in check, sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, rallies and political crises that seriously disrupt economic performance could be mitigated. Originality/value – To the best of the author's knowlege, there is yet no study that assesses monetary policy options that could be relevant in addressing the dramatic surge in the price of consumer commodities.}, keywords = {Africa, Banks, Development, inflation, Monetary policy, panel, Prices}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of policy options in financial dynamics (of money, credit, efficiency and size) on consumer prices. Soaring food prices have marked the geopolitical landscape of African countries in the past decade. Design/methodology/approach – The sample is limited to a panel of African countries for which inflation is non‐stationary. VAR models from both error correction and Granger causality perspectives are applied. Analyses of dynamic shocks and responses are also covered and six batteries of robustness checks are applied, to ensure consistency in the results. Findings – First, it is found that there are significant long‐run equilibriums between inflation and each financial dynamic. Second, when there is a disequilibrium, while only financial depth and financial size could be significantly used to exert deflationary pressures, inflation is significant in adjusting all financial dynamics. In other words, financial depth and financial size are more significant instruments in fighting inflation than financial efficiency and activity. Third, the financial intermediary dynamic of size appears to be more instrumental in exerting a deflationary tendency than financial intermediary depth. Fourth, the deflationary tendency from money supply is double that based on liquid liabilities. Practical implications – Monetary policy aimed at fighting inflation only based on bank deposits may not be very effective until other informal and semi‐formal financial sectors are taken into account. It could be inferred that, tight monetary policy targeting the ability of banks to grant credit (in relation to central bank credits) is more effective in tackling consumer price inflation than that, targeting the ability of banks to receive deposits. In the same vein, adjusting the lending rate could be more effective than adjusting the deposit rate. The insignificance of financial allocation efficiency and financial activity as policy tools in the battle against inflation could be explained by the (well documented) surplus liquidity issues experienced by the African banking sector. Social implications – This paper helps in providing monetary policy options in the fight against soaring consumer prices. By keeping inflationary pressures on food prices in check, sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, rallies and political crises that seriously disrupt economic performance could be mitigated. Originality/value – To the best of the author's knowlege, there is yet no study that assesses monetary policy options that could be relevant in addressing the dramatic surge in the price of consumer commodities. |
806. | Asongu, Simplice A Economics Bulletin, 33 (1), pp. 663 - 676, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Liberalization policies; Capital allocation; Africa @article{Asongu_768, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P63.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-12}, journal = {Economics Bulletin}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {663 - 676}, abstract = {This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It uses updated data to appraise second generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated policy implications. The ‘freedom to trade' and ‘economic freedom' indices are also employed. The following findings are established. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates financial allocation efficiency, with the magnitude of the de jure indicator (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports significantly improve financial efficiency. (3) Institutional liberalization has a positive effect on the efficiency of allocation while the effect of political liberalization is not significant. (4) Freedom of trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators. Justifications for these nexuses are provided.}, keywords = {Liberalization policies; Capital allocation; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It uses updated data to appraise second generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated policy implications. The ‘freedom to trade' and ‘economic freedom' indices are also employed. The following findings are established. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates financial allocation efficiency, with the magnitude of the de jure indicator (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports significantly improve financial efficiency. (3) Institutional liberalization has a positive effect on the efficiency of allocation while the effect of political liberalization is not significant. (4) Freedom of trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators. Justifications for these nexuses are provided. |
807. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of African Business, 14 (1), pp. 7-18, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Banking, Financial Development, Mobile phones, Shadow economy @article{Asongu_769, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15228916.2013.765309}, doi = {10.1080/15228916.2013.765309}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-06}, journal = {Journal of African Business}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {7-18}, abstract = {In the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the relationship between mobile phones and finance, the author examines the correlations between mobile phone penetration and financial development using two conflicting definitions of the financial system in the financial development literature. With the traditional International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2008) definition, mobile phone penetration has a negative correlation with traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity, and size. However, when a previously missing informal-financial sector component is integrated into the definition, mobile phone penetration has a positive correlation with informal financial development. Three implications result: There is a growing role of informal finance; mobile phone penetration may not be positively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators; and it is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial development indicators that will orient monetary policy.}, keywords = {Africa, Banking, Financial Development, Mobile phones, Shadow economy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the relationship between mobile phones and finance, the author examines the correlations between mobile phone penetration and financial development using two conflicting definitions of the financial system in the financial development literature. With the traditional International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2008) definition, mobile phone penetration has a negative correlation with traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity, and size. However, when a previously missing informal-financial sector component is integrated into the definition, mobile phone penetration has a positive correlation with informal financial development. Three implications result: There is a growing role of informal finance; mobile phone penetration may not be positively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators; and it is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial development indicators that will orient monetary policy. |
808. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5 (1), pp. 20 - 38, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Convergence, Currency area, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic disequilibrium, Financial Community of Africa, Monetary policy, National economy, Policy coordination @article{Asongu_770, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17576381311317763}, doi = {10.1108/17576381311317763}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-06}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {20 - 38}, abstract = {Purpose – A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones. Design/methodology/approach – In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence. Findings – But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. Practical implications – The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies. Originality/value – The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises.}, keywords = {Africa, Convergence, Currency area, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic disequilibrium, Financial Community of Africa, Monetary policy, National economy, Policy coordination}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones. Design/methodology/approach – In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence. Findings – But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. Practical implications – The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies. Originality/value – The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises. |
809. | Asongu, Simplice A Global dynamic timelines for IPRs harmonization against software piracy 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Software piracy; Intellectual property rights; Panel data; Convergence @workingpaper{Asongu2013bt, title = {Global dynamic timelines for IPRs harmonization against software piracy}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2013 Governance and Development Institute WP/13/010}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Global-dynamic-timelines-for-IPRs-harmonization-against-software-piracy.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-01}, abstract = {This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against software piracy. The findings on 99 countries are premised on 15 fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, SubSaharan Africa). The results broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years.}, keywords = {Software piracy; Intellectual property rights; Panel data; Convergence}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against software piracy. The findings on 99 countries are premised on 15 fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, SubSaharan Africa). The results broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years. |
810. | Asongu, Simplice A Economics Bulletin, 33 (1), pp. 401-414, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Financial Development; Shadow Economy; Poverty; Inequality; Africa @article{Asongu_772, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P39.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-02-15}, journal = {Economics Bulletin}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {401-414}, abstract = {In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we contribute at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and respond to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization are introduced. Four main findings are established: (1) while formal financial development decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-formalization is unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial informalization have an income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development is pro-poor. Policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {Financial Development; Shadow Economy; Poverty; Inequality; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the first empirical study on how financial reforms have been instrumental in mitigating inequality through financial sector competition, we contribute at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and respond to the growing field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion. Hitherto, unexplored financial sector concepts of formalization, semi-formalization and informalization are introduced. Four main findings are established: (1) while formal financial development decreases inequality, financial sector formalization increases it; (2) whereas semi-formal financial development increases inequality, the effect of financial semi-formalization is unclear; (3) both informal financial development and financial informalization have an income equalizing effect and; (4) non-formal financial development is pro-poor. Policy implications are discussed. |