PUBLICATIONS
The AGDI has published substantially in fulfillment of its mission statement of contributing to knowledge towards African development:
IDEAS
http://ideas.repec.org/d/agdiycm.html
ECONSTOR
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/escollectionhome/10419/123513
Publication List
2014 |
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11. | Asongu, Simplice A The questionable economics of development assistance in Africa: hot-fresh evidence, 1996-2010 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2014bn, title = {The questionable economics of development assistance in Africa: hot-fresh evidence, 1996-2010}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2014 Governance and Development Institute WP/20/14}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/The-questionable-economics-of-development-assistance-in-Africa,hot-fresh-evidence,1996-2010.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-08-01}, abstract = {This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed. |
12. | Asongu, Simplice A Taxation, foreign aid and political governance: figures to the facts of a celebrated literature 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2014bo, title = {Taxation, foreign aid and political governance: figures to the facts of a celebrated literature}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2014 Governance and Development Institute WP/22/14}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Taxation-foreign-aid-and-political-governance,.Figures-to-the-facts-of-a-celebrated-literature.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-08-01}, abstract = {This paper puts figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the Journal of Development Studies. We investigate the underpinning Somaliland-based hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. The assessment is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. For more policy options, the dataset is disaggregated into fundamental characteristics of African development based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources and landlockeness. While the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot conclude on its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. Policy implications, caveats and future directions are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This paper puts figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the Journal of Development Studies. We investigate the underpinning Somaliland-based hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. The assessment is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. For more policy options, the dataset is disaggregated into fundamental characteristics of African development based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources and landlockeness. While the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot conclude on its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. Policy implications, caveats and future directions are discussed. |
13. | Asongu, Mohamed Jellal Simplice A Foreign aid, investment and fiscal policy behavior: theory and empirical evidence 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2014br, title = {Foreign aid, investment and fiscal policy behavior: theory and empirical evidence}, author = {Mohamed Jellal Simplice A. Asongu}, editor = {African 2014 Governance and Development Institute WP/14/030}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Foreign-aid-investment-and-fiscal-behavior.-Theory-and-empirical-evidence.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-06-01}, abstract = {The paper provides theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy mechanisms. We propose an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro (1990) by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system on the private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, those of the government expenditure channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with the theoretical postulations. Justification for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } The paper provides theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy mechanisms. We propose an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro (1990) by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system on the private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, those of the government expenditure channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with the theoretical postulations. Justification for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications are discussed. |
14. | Asongu, Simplice A On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a celebrated literature 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2014bs, title = {On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a celebrated literature}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2014 Governance and Development Institute WP/17/14}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/On-taxation,-political-accountability-and-aid-,empirics-to-a-celebrated-literature(Full).pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-05-01}, abstract = {The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical evidence. This paper puts some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 broadly confirms the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political governance.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical evidence. This paper puts some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 broadly confirms the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political governance. |
15. | Asongu, Mohamed Jellal Simplice A International aid, corruption and fiscal policy behavior 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2014by, title = {International aid, corruption and fiscal policy behavior}, author = {Mohamed Jellal Simplice A. Asongu}, editor = {African 2014 Governance and Development Institute WP/14/007}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/International-aid-corruption-and-fiscal-policy-behavior.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-01-01}, abstract = {The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper provides a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings unite the two streams of the debate and broadly suggest that while the ‘government’s final consumption expenditure’ channel is consistent with the latter author, the investment and tax effort channels are in line with the former authors. Justifications for the nexuses are provided. Policy implications on how to use foreign aid constraints in managing fiscal behavior as means of reducing (increasing) corruption (corruption-control) are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper provides a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings unite the two streams of the debate and broadly suggest that while the ‘government’s final consumption expenditure’ channel is consistent with the latter author, the investment and tax effort channels are in line with the former authors. Justifications for the nexuses are provided. Policy implications on how to use foreign aid constraints in managing fiscal behavior as means of reducing (increasing) corruption (corruption-control) are discussed. |
2013 |
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16. | Asongu, Mohamed Jellal Simplice A Economics Bulletin, 33 (3), pp. 2191-2201, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @article{Asongu_748, author = {Mohamed Jellal Simplice A. Asongu}, url = {http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I3-P204.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-08-28}, journal = {Economics Bulletin}, volume = {33}, number = {3}, pages = {2191-2201}, abstract = {The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel. |
17. | Asongu, Simplice A On the effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2013bl, title = {On the effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2013 Governance and Development Institute WP/13/017}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/On-the-effectiveness-of-foreign-aid-in-institutional-quality.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-08-01}, abstract = {We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. |
18. | Asongu, Simplice A Consult your gods: the questionable economics of development assistance in Africa 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2013bm, title = {Consult your gods: the questionable economics of development assistance in Africa}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2013 Governance and Development Institute WP/13/002}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Consult-your-gods.-The-questionable-economics-of-development-assistance-in-Africa.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-07-01}, abstract = {This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed. |
19. | Asongu, Simplice A European Economic Letters, 2 (1), pp. 12-19, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @article{Asongu_755, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://eelet.org.uk/EEL2(1)12-19.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-06-01}, journal = {European Economic Letters}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {12-19}, abstract = {We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. |
20. | Asongu, Mohamed Jellal Simplice A On the channels of foreign aid to corruption 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa @workingpaper{Asongu2013bp, title = {On the channels of foreign aid to corruption}, author = {Mohamed Jellal Simplice A. Asongu}, editor = {African 2013 Governance and Development Institute WP/13/018}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/On-the-channels-of-foreign-aid-to-corruption.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-06-01}, abstract = {The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel.}, keywords = {Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel. |