AGDI a environ 300 publications actuellement.
2018 |
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| 1. | A., Efobi Beecroft Asongu U R I S Forum for Social Economics, 2018. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: FDI, Foreign aid, Quantile regression, terrorism @article{Asongu_370, author = {Efobi Beecroft U R I Asongu S. A.}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07360932.2018.1434676}, doi = {10.1080/07360932.2018.1434676}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-02-18}, journal = {Forum for Social Economics}, abstract = {We investigate how foreign aid dampens the effects of terrorism on FDI using interactive quantile regressions. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics entail: domestic, unclear, transnational and total number of terrorist attacks. The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be used as a policy tool to effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI. The positive threshold we cannot establish is important for policy makers because it communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely neutralizes the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. From the conditioning information set, we also establish for the most part that the effects of GDP growth, infrastructural development and trade openness are an increasing function of FDI. Policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {FDI, Foreign aid, Quantile regression, terrorism}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We investigate how foreign aid dampens the effects of terrorism on FDI using interactive quantile regressions. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics entail: domestic, unclear, transnational and total number of terrorist attacks. The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be used as a policy tool to effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI. The positive threshold we cannot establish is important for policy makers because it communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely neutralizes the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. From the conditioning information set, we also establish for the most part that the effects of GDP growth, infrastructural development and trade openness are an increasing function of FDI. Policy implications are discussed. |
2017 |
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| 2. | A., & Ssozi Asongu J S International Economic Journal, 2017. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Foreign aid, Quantile regression, terrorism @article{Asongu_436, author = {& Ssozi J Asongu S. A.}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10168737.2017.1350731}, doi = {10.1080/10168737.2017.1350731}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-07-13}, journal = {International Economic Journal}, abstract = {Building on the previous literature, we assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting terrorism using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We consistently establish that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. Policy implications and future research directions are discussed.}, keywords = {Foreign aid, Quantile regression, terrorism}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Building on the previous literature, we assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting terrorism using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984–2008. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We consistently establish that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. Policy implications and future research directions are discussed. |
2016 |
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| 3. | Asongu, John Anyanwu & Vanessa Tchamyou Simplice C S A Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Financial Development, Information Sharing, Quantile regression @workingpaper{Asongu2016g, title = {Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa}, author = {John Anyanwu & Vanessa Tchamyou C S Simplice A. Asongu}, url = {http://afridev.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Information-sharing-and-conditional-financial-development-in-Africa-4.pdf}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, journal = {Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa}, abstract = {This study examines conditional financial development from information sharing in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions (QR) which enable the assessment of the effect of information sharing throughout the conditional distributions of financial development dynamics. The policy relevance of the QR approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial development. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) while financial development is proxied with dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The following findings are established. First, for financial depth, while there is a positive threshold effect from PCR in money supply and liquid liabilities, the effect from PCB is mixed. Second, for financial efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB in banking system efficiency and (ii) U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB respectively in financial system efficiency. Third, for financial activity, there are consistent positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in banking system activity and financial system activity. Fourth, there are negative thresholds from PCR and PCB in financial size. Positive thresholds are consistent incremental financial development rewards from PCR and/or PCB with increasing financial development and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like patterns. As a main policy implication, initial conditions in financial development are essential to materialise incremental benefits from PCR and PCB. Other policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {Financial Development, Information Sharing, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This study examines conditional financial development from information sharing in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions (QR) which enable the assessment of the effect of information sharing throughout the conditional distributions of financial development dynamics. The policy relevance of the QR approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial development. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) while financial development is proxied with dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The following findings are established. First, for financial depth, while there is a positive threshold effect from PCR in money supply and liquid liabilities, the effect from PCB is mixed. Second, for financial efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB in banking system efficiency and (ii) U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB respectively in financial system efficiency. Third, for financial activity, there are consistent positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in banking system activity and financial system activity. Fourth, there are negative thresholds from PCR and PCB in financial size. Positive thresholds are consistent incremental financial development rewards from PCR and/or PCB with increasing financial development and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like patterns. As a main policy implication, initial conditions in financial development are essential to materialise incremental benefits from PCR and PCB. Other policy implications are discussed. |
2014 |
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| 4. | Asongu, Simplice A International Journal of Social Economics, 41 (10), pp. 906 - 922, 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Corruption, Freedom, Government quality, Quantile regression @article{Asongu_683, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-05-2013-0117}, doi = {10.1108/IJSE-05-2013-0117}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-09-16}, journal = {International Journal of Social Economics}, volume = {41}, number = {10}, pages = {906 - 922}, abstract = {Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of corruption-control (CC) with freedom dynamics (economic, political, press and trade), government quality (GQ) and a plethora of socio-economic factors in 46 African countries using updated data. Design/methodology/approach – A quantile regression approach is employed while controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. Principal component analysis is also used to reduce the dimensions of highly correlated variables. Findings – With the legal origin fundamental characteristic, the following findings have been established. First, while political freedom increases CC in a bottom quantile of English common-law countries, there is no such evidence in their French civil-law counterparts. Second, GQ consistently improves CC across all quantiles in English common-law countries but fails to exert the same effect in middle quantiles of French civil-law countries. Third, economic freedom ameliorates CC only in common-law countries with low existing CC levels (bottom quantiles). Fourth, The authors find no significant evidence of a positive “press freedom”-CC nexus and having the status of low-income English common-law (French civil law) countries decreases (increases) CC. From a religious domination scenario, the authors also find the following. First, political and trade freedoms only reduce CC in Christian-dominated countries while press freedom has a mitigation effect in both religious cultures (though more consistent across quantiles of Christian-oriented countries). Second, GQ is more pro-CC in Christian than in Muslim-dominated countries. Third, while economic freedom has a scanty negative nexus with CC in Christian-oriented countries, the effect is positive in their Muslim-dominated counterparts. Fourth, having a low-income status in countries with Christian common-law tradition improves CC. Originality/value – The authors complement the literature on the fight against corruption in Africa by employing recently documented additional factors that should be considered in corruption studies.}, keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Freedom, Government quality, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of corruption-control (CC) with freedom dynamics (economic, political, press and trade), government quality (GQ) and a plethora of socio-economic factors in 46 African countries using updated data. Design/methodology/approach – A quantile regression approach is employed while controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. Principal component analysis is also used to reduce the dimensions of highly correlated variables. Findings – With the legal origin fundamental characteristic, the following findings have been established. First, while political freedom increases CC in a bottom quantile of English common-law countries, there is no such evidence in their French civil-law counterparts. Second, GQ consistently improves CC across all quantiles in English common-law countries but fails to exert the same effect in middle quantiles of French civil-law countries. Third, economic freedom ameliorates CC only in common-law countries with low existing CC levels (bottom quantiles). Fourth, The authors find no significant evidence of a positive “press freedom”-CC nexus and having the status of low-income English common-law (French civil law) countries decreases (increases) CC. From a religious domination scenario, the authors also find the following. First, political and trade freedoms only reduce CC in Christian-dominated countries while press freedom has a mitigation effect in both religious cultures (though more consistent across quantiles of Christian-oriented countries). Second, GQ is more pro-CC in Christian than in Muslim-dominated countries. Third, while economic freedom has a scanty negative nexus with CC in Christian-oriented countries, the effect is positive in their Muslim-dominated counterparts. Fourth, having a low-income status in countries with Christian common-law tradition improves CC. Originality/value – The authors complement the literature on the fight against corruption in Africa by employing recently documented additional factors that should be considered in corruption studies. |
2013 |
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| 5. | Asongu, Simplice A Institutions and Economies, 5 (3), pp. 53-74, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression @article{Asongu_735, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://ijie.um.edu.my/filebank/published_article/5067/IE%203.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-09-04}, journal = {Institutions and Economies}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {53-74}, abstract = {Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? Do income-levels matter in the fight against corruption when existing corruption-control levels also matter? In other words, how does the wealth of nations matter in the fight against corruption when corruption is assessed throughout the conditional distribution of corruption-control from countries with low initial levels of corruption-control to those with high initial levels of corruption-control. To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established: (1) Population growth is a tool in the fight against corruption in Low income countries. (2) Democracy increases corruption-control in Middle income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income levels and political will in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, anti-corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.}, keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? Do income-levels matter in the fight against corruption when existing corruption-control levels also matter? In other words, how does the wealth of nations matter in the fight against corruption when corruption is assessed throughout the conditional distribution of corruption-control from countries with low initial levels of corruption-control to those with high initial levels of corruption-control. To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established: (1) Population growth is a tool in the fight against corruption in Low income countries. (2) Democracy increases corruption-control in Middle income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income levels and political will in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, anti-corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket. |
| 6. | Asongu, Simplice A International Journal of Development Issues, 12 (1), pp. 36 - 52, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression @article{Asongu_765, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14468951311322109}, doi = {10.1108/14468951311322109}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-03-13}, journal = {International Journal of Development Issues}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {36 - 52}, abstract = {Purpose – Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010. Design/methodology/approach – The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption. Findings – Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high. Social implications – The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight. Originality/value – This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.}, keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose – Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010. Design/methodology/approach – The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption. Findings – Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high. Social implications – The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight. Originality/value – This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption. |
2012 |
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| 7. | Asongu, Simplice A 2012. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression @workingpaper{Asongu2012bb, title = {Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what do wealth-effects tell us in Africa?}, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, editor = {African 2012 Governance and Development Institute WP/12/014}, url = {http://www.afridev.org/RePEc/agd/agd-wpaper/Fighting-corruption-when-existing-corruption-levels-count.-What-do-wealth-effects-tell-us-in-Africa.pdf}, year = {2012}, date = {2012-10-01}, abstract = {Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth effects play-out when existing corruption-control levels matter in the corruption battle? To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established. (1) Population growth is a (an) tool (impediment) in (to) the fight against corruption in Low (Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in Middle (Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income-levels and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.}, keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth effects play-out when existing corruption-control levels matter in the corruption battle? To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established. (1) Population growth is a (an) tool (impediment) in (to) the fight against corruption in Low (Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in Middle (Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income-levels and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket. |
