The AGDI has published substantially in fulfillment of its mission statement of contributing to knowledge towards African development:
IDEAS
http://ideas.repec.org/d/agdiycm.html
ECONSTOR
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/escollectionhome/10419/123513
Publications List
2018 |
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1. | A., & Nwachukwu Asongu J C S International Journal Managerial Finance, 14 (2), pp. p.188-209, 2018. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Bank size, Financial access, Information Sharing @article{Asongu_357, author = {& Nwachukwu J C Asongu S. A.}, url = {https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/IJMF-08-2017-0179}, doi = {10.1108/IJMF-08-2017-0179}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-04-24}, journal = {International Journal Managerial Finance}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {p.188-209}, abstract = {Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how bank size affects the role of information asymmetry on financial access in a panel of 162 banks in 39 African countries for the period 2001-2011. Design/methodology/approach The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable fixed effects regressions with overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds to control for the quiet life hypothesis (QLH). The QLH postulates that managers of large banks will use their privileges for private gains at the expense of making financial services more accessible to the general public. Financial access is measured with loan price and loan quantity whereas information asymmetry is implicit in the activities of public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Findings The findings with non-overlapping thresholds are broadly consistent with those that are conditional on overlapping thresholds. First, public credit registries have a decreasing effect on the price of loans with the magnitude of reduction comparable across all bank size thresholds. Second, both public credit registries and private credit bureaus enhance the quantity of loans. Third, compared with public credit registries, private credit bureaus have a greater influence in increasing financial access because they have a significantly higher favorable effect on the quantity and price of loans Fourth, the QLH is not apparent because large banks are not associated with lower levels of financial access compared to small banks. Originality/value Studies of public credit registries and private credit bureaus in Africa are sparse. This is one of the few to assess linkages between bank size, information asymmetry and financial access.}, keywords = {Bank size, Financial access, Information Sharing}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how bank size affects the role of information asymmetry on financial access in a panel of 162 banks in 39 African countries for the period 2001-2011. Design/methodology/approach The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable fixed effects regressions with overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds to control for the quiet life hypothesis (QLH). The QLH postulates that managers of large banks will use their privileges for private gains at the expense of making financial services more accessible to the general public. Financial access is measured with loan price and loan quantity whereas information asymmetry is implicit in the activities of public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Findings The findings with non-overlapping thresholds are broadly consistent with those that are conditional on overlapping thresholds. First, public credit registries have a decreasing effect on the price of loans with the magnitude of reduction comparable across all bank size thresholds. Second, both public credit registries and private credit bureaus enhance the quantity of loans. Third, compared with public credit registries, private credit bureaus have a greater influence in increasing financial access because they have a significantly higher favorable effect on the quantity and price of loans Fourth, the QLH is not apparent because large banks are not associated with lower levels of financial access compared to small banks. Originality/value Studies of public credit registries and private credit bureaus in Africa are sparse. This is one of the few to assess linkages between bank size, information asymmetry and financial access. |
2016 |
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2. | V., Asongu Tchamyou S A S Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa Journal Article Journal of African Business, 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Banking, Information Sharing @article{Asongu2016d, title = {Information Sharing and Financial Sector Development in Africa}, author = {Asongu S A Tchamyou S. V.}, url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15228916.2016.1216233}, doi = {10.1080/15228916.2016.1216233}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-08-13}, journal = {Journal of African Business}, abstract = {This study investigates the effect information sharing has on financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004 to 2011. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus and public credit registries. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization, and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The following findings are established. Information-sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. In order to ensure that information-sharing bureaus improve (decrease) formal (informal/non-formal) financial development, public credit registries should have between 45.45 and 50% coverage while private credit bureaus should have at least 26.25% coverage.}, keywords = {Africa, Banking, Information Sharing}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This study investigates the effect information sharing has on financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004 to 2011. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus and public credit registries. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization, and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The following findings are established. Information-sharing bureaus increase (reduce) formal (informal/non-formal) financial sector development. In order to ensure that information-sharing bureaus improve (decrease) formal (informal/non-formal) financial development, public credit registries should have between 45.45 and 50% coverage while private credit bureaus should have at least 26.25% coverage. |
3. | Asongu, John Anyanwu & Vanessa Tchamyou Simplice C S A Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Financial Development, Information Sharing, Quantile regression @workingpaper{Asongu2016g, title = {Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa}, author = {John Anyanwu & Vanessa Tchamyou C S Simplice A. Asongu}, url = {http://afridev.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Information-sharing-and-conditional-financial-development-in-Africa-4.pdf}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, journal = {Information sharing and conditional financial development in Africa}, abstract = {This study examines conditional financial development from information sharing in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions (QR) which enable the assessment of the effect of information sharing throughout the conditional distributions of financial development dynamics. The policy relevance of the QR approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial development. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) while financial development is proxied with dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The following findings are established. First, for financial depth, while there is a positive threshold effect from PCR in money supply and liquid liabilities, the effect from PCB is mixed. Second, for financial efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB in banking system efficiency and (ii) U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB respectively in financial system efficiency. Third, for financial activity, there are consistent positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in banking system activity and financial system activity. Fourth, there are negative thresholds from PCR and PCB in financial size. Positive thresholds are consistent incremental financial development rewards from PCR and/or PCB with increasing financial development and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like patterns. As a main policy implication, initial conditions in financial development are essential to materialise incremental benefits from PCR and PCB. Other policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {Financial Development, Information Sharing, Quantile regression}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workingpaper} } This study examines conditional financial development from information sharing in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions (QR) which enable the assessment of the effect of information sharing throughout the conditional distributions of financial development dynamics. The policy relevance of the QR approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of information sharing in financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial development. Information sharing is measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) while financial development is proxied with dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. The following findings are established. First, for financial depth, while there is a positive threshold effect from PCR in money supply and liquid liabilities, the effect from PCB is mixed. Second, for financial efficiency, there is a: (i) contemporary positive threshold from PCR and mixed effect from PCB in banking system efficiency and (ii) U-shape and positive threshold from PCR and PCB respectively in financial system efficiency. Third, for financial activity, there are consistent positive thresholds from PCR and PCB in banking system activity and financial system activity. Fourth, there are negative thresholds from PCR and PCB in financial size. Positive thresholds are consistent incremental financial development rewards from PCR and/or PCB with increasing financial development and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Mixed effects are characterised by S-shaped, Kuznets or wave-like patterns. As a main policy implication, initial conditions in financial development are essential to materialise incremental benefits from PCR and PCB. Other policy implications are discussed. |