The AGDI has published substantially in fulfillment of its mission statement of contributing to knowledge towards African development:
IDEAS
http://ideas.repec.org/d/agdiycm.html
ECONSTOR
https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/escollectionhome/10419/123513
Publications List
2016 |
|
1. | Andrés, Simplice Asongu Antonio A R Journal of Economic Studies, 43 (5), pp. 780-800, 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Intellectual property rights, panel data models, Software piracy @article{Asongu_533, author = {Simplice Asongu A Antonio R. Andrés}, url = {http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/JES-06-2015-0093}, doi = {10.1108/JES-06-2015-0093}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-09-15}, journal = {Journal of Economic Studies}, volume = {43}, number = {5}, pages = {780-800}, abstract = {Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine global trajectories, dynamics, and tendencies of software piracy to ease the benchmarking of current efforts toward harmonizing the standards and enforcements of intellectual property rights (henceforth IPRs) protection worldwide. Design/methodology/approach For that purpose, the authors estimate dynamic panel data models for 99 countries over the period 1994-2010. Findings The main finding suggest that, a genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against software piracy is most feasible within a horizon of 4.3-10.4 years. In other words, full (100 percent) convergence within the specified timeframe will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality or locality within identified fundamental characteristics of software piracy. The absence of convergence (in absolute and conditional terms) for the World panel indicates that, blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy. Policy implications and caveats are also discussed. Originality/value It is the first attempt to empirically assess the convergence of IPRs systems across countries.}, keywords = {Intellectual property rights, panel data models, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine global trajectories, dynamics, and tendencies of software piracy to ease the benchmarking of current efforts toward harmonizing the standards and enforcements of intellectual property rights (henceforth IPRs) protection worldwide. Design/methodology/approach For that purpose, the authors estimate dynamic panel data models for 99 countries over the period 1994-2010. Findings The main finding suggest that, a genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against software piracy is most feasible within a horizon of 4.3-10.4 years. In other words, full (100 percent) convergence within the specified timeframe will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality or locality within identified fundamental characteristics of software piracy. The absence of convergence (in absolute and conditional terms) for the World panel indicates that, blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on the prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy. Policy implications and caveats are also discussed. Originality/value It is the first attempt to empirically assess the convergence of IPRs systems across countries. |
2. | A., Singh Le Roux Asongu P S S Journal of Business Ethics, 2016. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy @article{Asongu_548, author = {Singh Le Roux P S Asongu S. A.}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-016-3291-7}, doi = {10.1007/s10551-016-3291-7}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-08-13}, journal = {Journal of Business Ethics}, abstract = {This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries over the period 1994–2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with the increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with the increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover, the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with the increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study.}, keywords = {Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries over the period 1994–2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with the increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with the increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover, the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with the increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study. |
2015 |
|
3. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 6 (4), pp. 682-703, 2015. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy @article{Asongu_601, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13132-012-0137-0}, doi = {10.1007%2Fs13132-012-0137-0}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-12-01}, journal = {Journal of the Knowledge Economy}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {682-703}, abstract = {In the current efforts toward harmonizing intellectual property rights (IPRs) regimes in the African continent, this paper provides answers to four key questions relevant in the policy decision-making processes. After empirically examining the questions, the following findings are established. (1) In comparison to common law countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant autonomous rate of software piracy; consistent with the “law and property rights” theory. (2) But for IPRs laws, the other intellectual property (IP) protection channels (World Intellectual Property Organization treaties, main IP law, and multilateral treaties) reduce the incidence of software piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law countries appear to mitigate software piracy more than in common law countries. (4) Formal institutions are instrumental in the fight against software piracy through IPRs protection channels.}, keywords = {Africa, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the current efforts toward harmonizing intellectual property rights (IPRs) regimes in the African continent, this paper provides answers to four key questions relevant in the policy decision-making processes. After empirically examining the questions, the following findings are established. (1) In comparison to common law countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant autonomous rate of software piracy; consistent with the “law and property rights” theory. (2) But for IPRs laws, the other intellectual property (IP) protection channels (World Intellectual Property Organization treaties, main IP law, and multilateral treaties) reduce the incidence of software piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law countries appear to mitigate software piracy more than in common law countries. (4) Formal institutions are instrumental in the fight against software piracy through IPRs protection channels. |
2014 |
|
4. | Asongu, Simplice A Institutions and Economies, 6 (2), pp. 1-26, 2014. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Africa, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy @article{Asongu_701, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://ijie.um.edu.my/filebank/published_article/6528/IE%201.pdf}, year = {2014}, date = {2014-06-04}, journal = {Institutions and Economies}, volume = {6}, number = {2}, pages = {1-26}, abstract = {With the proliferation of technology used to prate software, this paper answers some key questions in policy decision making. Dynamic panel Generalized Methods of Moments and Two Stage Least Squares are employed. IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumented with government quality dynamics to assess their incidence on software piracy. The following findings are established. (1) Government institutions are crucial in enforcing IPRs laws (treaties) in the fight against software piracy. (2) Main IP laws enacted by the legislature and Multilateral IP laws are most effective in combating piracy. (3) IPRs laws, WIPO Treaties and Bilateral Treaties do not have significant negative incidences on software piracy. Policy implications are discussed.}, keywords = {Africa, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } With the proliferation of technology used to prate software, this paper answers some key questions in policy decision making. Dynamic panel Generalized Methods of Moments and Two Stage Least Squares are employed. IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumented with government quality dynamics to assess their incidence on software piracy. The following findings are established. (1) Government institutions are crucial in enforcing IPRs laws (treaties) in the fight against software piracy. (2) Main IP laws enacted by the legislature and Multilateral IP laws are most effective in combating piracy. (3) IPRs laws, WIPO Treaties and Bilateral Treaties do not have significant negative incidences on software piracy. Policy implications are discussed. |
2013 |
|
5. | Andrés, Simplice Asongu Antonio A R Journal of Business Ethics, 118 (3), pp. 667-682, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Governance tools, Instrumental variables, Intellectual property rights, Software piracy @article{Asongu_728, author = {Simplice Asongu A Antonio R. Andrés}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-013-1620-7}, doi = {10.1007/s10551-013-1620-7}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-12-12}, journal = {Journal of Business Ethics}, volume = {118}, number = {3}, pages = {667-682}, abstract = {This article integrates previously missing components of government quality into the governance-piracy nexus in exploring governance mechanisms by which global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are effectively transmitted from international to the national level in the battle against piracy. It assesses the best governance tools in the fight against piracy and upholding of intellectual property rights (IPRs). The instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in tackling piracy through good governance mechanisms is also examined. Findings demonstrate that: (1) while all governance tools under consideration significantly decrease the incidence of piracy, corruption-control is the most effective weapon; (2) but for voice and accountability, political stability and democracy, IPR laws (treaties) are instrumental in tackling piracy through government quality dynamics of rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, and press freedom. Hence, the need for a policy approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement an integrated system of both IPRs and corollary good governance policies. Moreover, our findings support the relevance of good governance measures in developing countries wishing to complement their emerging IPR regimes.}, keywords = {Governance tools, Instrumental variables, Intellectual property rights, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article integrates previously missing components of government quality into the governance-piracy nexus in exploring governance mechanisms by which global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are effectively transmitted from international to the national level in the battle against piracy. It assesses the best governance tools in the fight against piracy and upholding of intellectual property rights (IPRs). The instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in tackling piracy through good governance mechanisms is also examined. Findings demonstrate that: (1) while all governance tools under consideration significantly decrease the incidence of piracy, corruption-control is the most effective weapon; (2) but for voice and accountability, political stability and democracy, IPR laws (treaties) are instrumental in tackling piracy through government quality dynamics of rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, and press freedom. Hence, the need for a policy approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement an integrated system of both IPRs and corollary good governance policies. Moreover, our findings support the relevance of good governance measures in developing countries wishing to complement their emerging IPR regimes. |
6. | Asongu, Simplice A Journal of Business Ethics, 118 (1), pp. 45-60, 2013. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Convergence, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy @article{Asongu_729, author = {Simplice A Asongu}, url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-012-1552-7}, doi = {10.1007/s10551-012-1552-7}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-12-04}, journal = {Journal of Business Ethics}, volume = {118}, number = {1}, pages = {45-60}, abstract = {In the current efforts of harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide, this paper explores software piracy trajectories and dynamics in Africa. Using a battery of estimation techniques that ignore as well as integrate short-run disturbances in time-dynamic fashion, we answer the big questions policy makers are most likely to ask before harmonizing IPRs regimes in the battle against software piracy. Three main findings are established. (1) African countries with low software piracy rates are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates; implying despite existing divergent IPRs systems, convergence in piracy rate could be a genuine standard-setting platform. (2) Legal origins do not play a very significant role in the convergence process. (3) A genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against piracy is most likely between a horizon of 4–8 years. In other words, full (100 %) convergence within the specified horizon will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and locality. Policy implications and caveats are discussed.}, keywords = {Convergence, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Software piracy}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the current efforts of harmonizing the standards and enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide, this paper explores software piracy trajectories and dynamics in Africa. Using a battery of estimation techniques that ignore as well as integrate short-run disturbances in time-dynamic fashion, we answer the big questions policy makers are most likely to ask before harmonizing IPRs regimes in the battle against software piracy. Three main findings are established. (1) African countries with low software piracy rates are catching-up their counterparts with higher rates; implying despite existing divergent IPRs systems, convergence in piracy rate could be a genuine standard-setting platform. (2) Legal origins do not play a very significant role in the convergence process. (3) A genuine timeframe for standardizing IPRs laws in the fight against piracy is most likely between a horizon of 4–8 years. In other words, full (100 %) convergence within the specified horizon will mean the enforcements of IPRs regimes without distinction of nationality and locality. Policy implications and caveats are discussed. |