PUBLICATIONS

@article{Asongu_680,
author = {Simplice A Asongu},
url = {http://ijie.um.edu.my/filebank/published_article/7053/(5)%20Journal%20IJIE_Simplice.pdf},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-10-08},
journal = {Institutions and Economies},
volume = {6},
number = {3},
pages = {92-116},
abstract = {This paper focuses on how political regimes affect financial
developments in Africa and the role of dominant religion, income levels and
colonial legacies in this regard. The findings indicate that authoritarian
regimes have a higher propensity to effect policies that favour the development of financial intermediary depth, activity and size. Democracy has important effects on the degree of competition for public offices but is less significant in influencing policies related to promoting financial development when compared with autocracies. Once democracy is initiated, it should be accelerated (to edge out the appeals of authoritarian regimes) to reap the benefits of level and time hypotheses in financial development.},
keywords = {Banking, Democracy, Development, Finance, Politics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

@article{Asongu_735,
author = {Simplice A Asongu},
url = {http://ijie.um.edu.my/filebank/published_article/5067/IE%203.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-09-04},
journal = {Institutions and Economies},
volume = {5},
number = {3},
pages = {53-74},
abstract = {Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across
developing nations? Do income-levels matter in the fight against corruption
when existing corruption-control levels also matter? In other words, how does the wealth of nations matter in the fight against corruption when corruption is assessed throughout the conditional distribution of corruption-control from countries with low initial levels of corruption-control to those with high initial levels of corruption-control. To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established: (1) Population growth is a tool in the fight against corruption in Low income countries. (2) Democracy increases corruption-control in Middle income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income levels and political will in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, anti-corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.},
keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

@article{Asongu_765,
author = {Simplice A Asongu},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14468951311322109},
doi = {10.1108/14468951311322109},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-03-13},
journal = {International Journal of Development Issues},
volume = {12},
number = {1},
pages = {36 - 52},
abstract = {Purpose
– Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010.

Design/methodology/approach
– The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption.

Findings
– Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high.

Social implications
– The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight.

Originality/value
– This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.},
keywords = {Africa, Corruption, Democracy, Government quality, Quantile regression},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}